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ABSTRACT
This paper is a theoretical analysis of individual and societal
demands for life saving. We begin by demonstrating that the allocation
of health expenditures to maximize lives saved may be inconsistent
with the willingness—to—pay criterion and consumer sovereignty. We
further investigate the effects of information on aggregate willing-
ness to pay. This discussion is related to the concepts of statist-
ical and identified lives. Methods of financing health expenditures
are considered. We show that risk averse individuals may reject
actuarially fair insurance for treatments of fatal diseases even if
they plan to pay for the treatment if they get sick. This result
has implications regarding the choice of treatment or prevention.
Finally, we examine the importance of the timing of life-saving
decisions. A conflict arises between society's preferences before
it is known who will be sick and after, even if it is known in
advance how many people will be sick.
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Economists who have worked in the area of health economics have
generally offered policy—makers two pieces of advice. First, policy—
makers have been urged to equate the productivity of various expendi-
tures at the margin. In this spirit economists have frequently pointed
to large discrepencies in costs per lTe saved among different govern-
ment programs as an example of serious misallocations of resources.
A reallocation, it is argued, could increase lives saved while holding
expenditures constant.
A second frequent bit of advice is to try to allocate resources
in a way which approximates the allocation which would occur in a
market setting. Thus consumers' willingness to pay should be used as
an indicator of their valuation of government programs.
In recent years, economists have forged a link between these
two pieces of advice. They show that there Is a well—defined concept
of the "value of life" based on the willingness to pay approach and
that the use of this concept in project evaluation leads to an allocation
of expenditures across programs so as to maximize the number of lives
saved
This value of life concept is based on the amount of money an
individual would be willing to pay to reduce his chance of death by a
small amount. For example, suppose that an individual is willing to
pay $500 for an increase in his survival chances of 1/1000.
A thousand such individuals would be willing, collectively, to pay
$500,000 for a project that increased the survival chances of each person
Note: The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in health economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.2
by 1/1000. If implemented, the project would be expected (in a statisti-
cal sense) to reduce the number of deaths by one among the group of one
thousand people. In this sense, the value of a "statistical life" is
said to be $500,000. The willingness to pay approach would then suggest
that the project be adopted if its cost is less than $500,000 and be
rejected if its cost is more than $500,000. More broadly, this approach
suggests that expenditures on each health or safety program be increased
or decreased until the marginal cost of an additional (statistical) life
saved is equal to the value of a (statistical) life. Such a policy
would maximize the expected number of lives saved, given the level of
aggregate expenditures on health and safety.
There is considerable appeal to this approach both because of
its theoretical basis and the relative simplicity of using it in
practice. For example, a glance at Table 1 shows radically different
costs per life saved for various governmental health and safety programs.
Ignoring possible discrepancies between average and marginal costs and
certain other qualifications, it is clear that survival rates could be
increased by reallocating resources away from cancer diagnosis toward
safety belts and other safety devices. Moreover, this approach seems
to be gaining acceptance among noneconomists. For example, Dr. Robert
Grossman, acting director of the dialysis program at the University of
Pennsylvania Hospital, has stated:
I can see us in the next few years having programs for people
with heart disease, people with cancer, and it's something we
can't afford.I don't even know if we can afford this [the
dialysis programj. The question is, how much is a life worth?
We're seeing a resurgence of polio (and other diseases) because
children are not getting their shots. Can we afford this at a
time when we could be spending the money on basic health care
to keep the general population healthy?23
Table 1. "Cost" of a life.
Cost of program
Program per death avoided
(Thousands of dollars)
Safety belts 87
Other safety devices 103
Pedestrian education 666
Motorcycle helmets 3,300
Cancer of the uterus treatment 3,500
Campaign against drunken driving 5,800
Lung cancer treatment 6,400
Breast cancer treatment 7,700
Physical checkup upon application for license 13,800
Syphilis treatment 22,300
Tuberculosis treatment 22,800
Head and neck cancer treatment 29,100
Cancer of the colon and rectum treatment 42,900
Source:W. Gorman, "Deux années d'exprience dans l'application du
PPBS on comment a mliorer le partage du gâteau public?"
Analyse et Prvision, Vol. V, No. 6, June 1968, pp. 403—416.
Cited in The Price of Health, Jean—Luc Migu and Grard
Blanger, Macmillan Company, Canada, 1974.4
In this paper, we argue that the link between the willingness
to pay criterion and the goal of maximizing lives saved is neither so
secure nor so simple as much of the recent economic literature has
portrayed it to be. Is it really true that we can tell at a glance
that the governmental health and safety programs listed in Table 1 are
grossly inefficient because they fa4i to equate the cost per life saved
across programs? If so, how can we rationalize the fact that many
individuals in their private decisions appear to display large variations
in the marginal cost per unit increase in survival probability across
different activities? Our impression is that many of the same people
who refuse to purchase or use seat belts are also willing to pay large
sums for apparently ineffective treatments such as laetrile should
they get cancer. Indeed, the private preference for treatment over
prevention is frequently decried by physicians and policy—makers.
The main thrust of our paper is to re—examine the value that
private individuals place on their own lives in various kinds of
situations. We then attempt to use this analysis to shed light on the
uses of the willingness to pay criteria for public policy problems and
the circumstances under which maximization of lives saved is a rational
policy goal.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section I examines indi-
viduals' demand for life—saving programs. We show that those individuals
with low survival chances will pay more for a given increment in
probability of life than an otherwise identical but healthy individual.
This is shown to be a result of the inability to trade life—saving
chances among different people.5
Section II investigates the effects of information on
willingness to pay. We find that certain types of information will
increase the divergence between willingness to pay and maximizing
lives saved.
Section III considers the financing of health expenditures.
We see that risk averse individuals may reject fair insurance for
treatments of fatal diseases even if they plan to pay for the treat-
ment if they get sick. This result has important implications regarding
the choice of prevention or treatment.
Section IV looks at the timing of life—saving decisions. We
show that while willingness—to—pay may be inconsistent with maximizing
lives saved after some people are sick, if all decisions were made
before it was known who would get sick the two criteria would be
identical. We then briefly discuss how such a policy could be
implemented.6
I. INDIVIDUAL DEMAND FOR LIFE-SAVING
Before beginning our analysis a few caveats and disclaimers
are in order. First, the term "lifesaving" is really a misnomer.
Lives cannot really be saved; they can only be prolonged. Nevertheless,
we will maintain the usual nomenclature. Dealing with lives saved
allows us to keep our formal analyses reasonably simple, without exces-
sive loss of generality. Essentially we collapse an intertemporal
stochastic choice problem into a single periodproblem.3
Another issue we will ignore for the most part is variation in
the quality of lives saved. Saving young people may be more valuable
than saving old ones, saving the healthy more valuable than the crippled,
etc., but we will model societies with identical people, and thus avoid
such issues. These issues have been discussed at length by Zeckhauser
and Shepard [19761.
Finally, we ignore the bequest motive. If bequests are treated
in models, the usual way is to introduce an additional bequest function;
thus expected utility is given by
(1) pU(X) + (l—p) i(B),
where p is the probability of survival, X is consumption conditional
upon the individual living, B is the bequest left toone's heirs.
This is a very special form of additive separability in which the
weights applied to the utility of consumption and bequests are just
the survival and death probabilities. In particular, this specifica-
tion assures that the contribution to expected utility from bequests7
is proportional to the probability of death. We know of no empirical
support for this hypothesis. One alternative would be to adopt a more
general formulation such as
(2) EU =U(p,X, F)
(3) F =f(p,X, B),
where f is the group utility function of other family members and
depends on the probability of survival, the individual's family
wealth CX) conditional upon living, and bequests (B). One might
additionally assume that f is additively separable of the form
F =pf1(X)+ (l—p) f2(B), where f1 and f2 are the family's utility
functions in the states in which the individual is alive or dead
respectively. Without empirical evidence to suggest constraints, the
above specification yields few theoretical results. Furthermore, there
is no theoretical rationalization for bequests being a one—way street.
While a sick individual may obtain utility from increasing bequests, his
heirs may simultaneously obtain utility from increasing either his con-
sumption or chances for survival. Without empirical evidence it is
impossible to predict which effect will dominate.4 Thus we adopt the
simplification of ignoring bequests and expected utility is simply EU =
pU(X).
1.1 The Value of Life Saving
We now investigate the individual's demand for life—saving. The







Thalerand Rosen [19761 empirically measured V by examining wage differ-
entials in hazardous occupations and found V to be roughly $200,000 in
1967 dollars.
Given a single measure of the v1ue of a life, the implications
are that a government that wishes to maximize the benefits of adopting
life—savingprograms should maximize lives saved. In addition, if we
can agree that V is roughly $200,000 then we have a convenient cut—off
point: All life—saving projects that are undertaken should be operated
at the level where the last life saved cost just $200,000.
But what if some lives are worth more than others, either to
their owners or to society? Then saving 50 more valuable lives may be
considerably more efficient than saving 100 less valuable lives. Why
might the value of lives differ? First, we've said nothing about the
income distribution in society. Assuming that some individuals are
wealthier than others, and that life—saving is a normal good, the more
wealthy will clearly be desirous of purchasing more life—saving for
themselves, just as they purchase more of everything else.
Even in an egalitarian society where all members
have identical wealth, some lives may still be more valuable than
others. Much like a wealth distribution, there exists a distribution
of survival probabilities——some people are more likely to die than
others. Again assuming that life—saving is like any other normal
economic good,, individuals with lower survival probabilities should
be willing to pay more than individuals with higher survival proba-
bilities for a life—saving project.9
A game of Russian roulette illustrates this point.5 Suppose
an individual is forced to play a single game of Russian roulette.
Before the game is "played" he is ailowed to purLhase the removal of
one bullet. How does his willingness to pay for this bullet removal
depend on the proportion of the chambers that are full?
Proposition 1: The amount an individual will pay for a given increase
in the probability of survival, p, is inversely




this proposition follows simply from the assumption that both
consumption and probability of survival are normal goods.
The importance of Proposition 1 can be illustrated by a simple
numerical example.
Example 1:Consider a society of 25 people where everyone has the
utility function p ln(X+l),where specifically X =10.
Assume that the society is divided into two groups. Group I
has 10 members each with p= .2, while Group II has 15 mem-
bers each with p =.7.
A treatment can be provided to either group at the same
total cost, and will reduce the fatality rate of either
group by 0.1. Which treatment should be provided?
Table 2 displays the amount an individual with the posited
utility function will pay for a .1 increase in p as p varies from 0 to .9.
The division of society into two groups can be thought of as
two different diseases, with the Group I disease more likely to be fatal.
The specification that treatment costs are identical is mainly a
specification of extreme economies of scale; for instance, all the10



















Assumptions:Individuals maximize pU(X), U(X) =ln(x+l)over an
initial endowment of $10.00.11
costs may be in research. Finally, since the treatment reduces the
fatality rate of either group by .1 (i.e., yielding a Group I and Group II
survival rate of 0.3 and 0.8 respectively), the implied cure rates are
different. The treatment produces a cure only one—eighth of the time
for Group I, but one—third of the time for Group II.
If the willingness to pay c:iterion is used, then the treatment
should be provided to Group I since collectively they would be willing
to pay up to $60.50 while Group II would pay at most $42.75. The point
of interest in this example is that this choice does not maximize the
number of lives expected to be saved. Providing treatment for Group I
would save an expected 1 life, while providing treatment for Group II
would save an expected 1.5 lives. We do not save the maximum number of
lives because Group I values an increase in their survival chances more
than Group II.
1.2 Inability to Trade
The reason why we fail to maximize lives saved in the previous
example, and the reason why Proposition 1 is important, is that unlike
most goods, there are very sharp limitations on the extent to which
survival probabilities can be traded in the market place. For freely
traded goods we know that everyone who consumes a positive quantity of
the good values an extra unit of the good equally. In life saving,
marginal valuations differ among individuals because they cannot trade
to equate those valuations. If a man in our numerical example gets
very sick, reducing his p from .9 to .2, he would pay up to $6.05 to
increase his survival probability to .3. If it were possible to do so,12
others whose p were still .9 would be willing to give up .1 oftheir
survival chances for anything over $3.84 (not shown in Table 1).
Of course, current technologies (aside from some transplant operations)
do not permit such trades. Once the inability to trade is recognized,
failure to maximize lives saved seems lessparadoxical.7
The reader may be troubled uy our assumption that bullets cannot
be traded. Can't individuals, in fact, adjust their lifestylesto alter
their survival probability? We wish to argue that while there arein
fact many ways an individual can regulate the safety level he faces, our
no trade assumption is reasonable on two grounds.
First, when faced with a substantial probabilityof death from
a disease any adjustments the individual mightmake would be small
relative to the risk from the disease. A healthy man aged 35faces a
total risk of death in one year of about .002. Even if heworks in a
very risky occupation his risk of dyingis unlikely to increase more
than .005. (See Thaler and Rosen [19761.) Thus, compared to arisk of
death of even .05, any changes in lifestyle would be of atrivial level.
Second, even if individuals could make significant changesin
their lifestyles to lower the risk of dying when they contracted the
disease, they wouldnot choose to do so. Assume that the individual
faces two independent sources of death risk which we will call discre-
tionary and non—discretionary. The non—discretionary risk might be a
disease and the discretionary risk might stem from an occupational
choice. Let be the probability that the individual will die from
the nondiscretionary risk and 2 be the probability he will die from
the discretionary risk. The probability of death, 4,isthen
=13
Will an individual's choice of 2 depend on l? Will a man with a dis-
ease which might kill him take any more or less risk in his everyday
life? One is tempted to argue both ways. On te one hand, a person
with a disease seems to have less to lose by taking a risky job. On
the other hand, he might want to '1compensate" for his disease risk by
being very careful in every way he ean. As we show in Proposition 2,
given our assumptions, the arguments cancel.
Proposition 2: The amount of money necessary to compensate an individual
for taking some risk 2 does not depend on the level of
other independent risks he faces,
Proof:(l—1)U(x) =expectedutility without discretionary risk
(l—)U(x+c) =expectedutility with discretionary risk,
where c is chosen such that
(1—q1)U(x) =(1—4)U(x+c) =(1—4l)(l —2)U(x+c).
Hence,
U(x) =(l—42)U(x+c),
which is independentof . Q.E.D.
This proposition simply states that independent events are treated
independently. The policy implication in evaluating a project which
alters the probability of survival for some population is that policy—
makers should ignore other sources of risk so long as those other risks
are independent of the risk associated with the project. Thus in
comparing sites for nuclear plants, it would be unnecessary to consider
the occupational risks faced by the nearby population as long as they
are independent of risks from the power plant. However, risk of earth-
quake would have to be considered since an earthquake could increase
the risks from the power plant, thus violating the independence assump—
tion.14
II. IDENTIFIED LIVES
Thomas Schelling [19681 was the first writer to make the
Important distinction between identified and statistical lives:
Let a six—year—old girl with brown hair need thousands of
dollars for an operation that iil prolong her life until
Christmas, and the post office will be swamped with nickels
and dimes to save her. But let it be reported that without
sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will
deteriorate and cause a barely perceptible increase in
preventable deaths——not many will drop a tear or reach for
their checkbooks.
The girl in the above example is an "identified" life, whereas
the lives lost due to hospital deterioration are "statistical."
There are three senses in which the girl's life differs from a sta-
tistical life. She is "identified" in the sense that (1) other
people are willing to help her; (2) she has poorer than average sur-
vival chances; and (3) a program can be named that will help her and
only her. The interesting point Schelling makes is that i is often
easier to gather popular support to save identified rather than sta-
tistical lives.
Evidently Schelling intended the term "identified life" to be de-
fined in the first of these senses.8 The girl's life is identified
because her personal plight provokes sympathy and a willingness to pay
by others that is not stimulated by the anonymous and impersonal sta-
tistical life.9
In this paper we wish to concentrate on individuals' willingness
to pay for improvements in their own survival probabilities. Thus the
last two senses of the term "identified life" will be used in this
section.15
In particular, we consider identification as synonymous with
information.10 Ultimately, some Individuals willget cancer, will get
heart disease, will be involved in automobile accidents, etc. Informa-
tion about the assignment of individuals to these health status cells
will be labeled "individual identification." Lives are "unidentified"
if each individual attributes the sie probability of assignment to each
health status cell as all other individuals. Simultaneously, programs
can be listed that will increase survival rates of cancer, heart disease,
and accident victims. Information about the distribution of (expected)
benefits across health status cells will be labeled "project identifi-
cation." A project is "unidentified" if all health status cell survival
rates are expected to be affected equally.
The framework used here centers on these health status cells.11
Each cell has associated with it a survival rate. Individuals are
assigned to cells. Prior to assignment each individual has his own
estimate of the probability he will be assigned to each cell. Individuals
form estimated probability of survival by taking cell assignment proba-
bility weighted averages of cell survival rates. Projects can be named
that affect the survival ratein various cells. Individuals form estimates
of the benefits (to themselves) of a given project by taking cell assign-
ment probability weighted averages of project Induced cell survival
probability Increments.
We basically wish to ask one question using this framework:
What kinds of Information will alter the value of a life? In section 11.1
we address this question with respect to individual Identification. In
section 11.2 the analysis is repeated for project identification.
Section 11.3 discusses the results.16
11.1. Individual Identification
Let there be K health status cells which we will denote by
k, kl,...,K. In addition, let there be N individuals denoted by 1,
i=l,...,N. There may be more or fewer cells than individuals. The
"aggregate informationt' available to individuals is denoted by
where k is the probability that a rindomly drawn individual will be
assigned to cell k. Clearly, k is nothing more than the population
rate. If the only information available to individuals is the popula-
tion rates, then each individual will view his probability of survival
as being the same, given by
(2.1) =
k
where is the probability of survival in cell k. We will refer to
this case as the no individual identification case, 1=0. In this case
the value of a life is given by
PU'(X)
Now consider any other state of information denoted by ik'
where is the probability individual i attributes to his assignment
to cell k. We require a special form of coherence: If some individual
believes that he is more likely than average to be assigned to cell k,
then other individuals taken as a group must believe that they are less






Thus, we consider changes indistributional information holding aggregate
information constant. Individual i nowattributes probability P1,
(2.4) Pi =ikk
to his survival, and P may beinterpcted as the average survival
rate.




=V(O)+U(X [1 (1 —
Ifwe define individual identification,I, as the bracketed term,
Equation (2.5) may be rewritten
(2.6) v(I) =v(o)+ I
Thus, I is a sufficient statisticfor this problem. Information that
increases I increases the valueof a life.
It is quite simple to show that, given
coherence, I is bounded
from below by zero and that any divergencefrom no distributional
information must increasei)2 Further, I is additive in the sense that
moving from any state of information I
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Other properties of I are most easily shown by example, which is done
in Table 3. We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Table 3. Examples of I values.
Distributional information I
1.P1 =P=.9











Assumptions:100persons with 90 expected to survive.







always increases the value of a life. In particular, given anylevel
of information I, the value of a life is given by
where
U (X) v(I) =v(0)+
U'(X)
U (x) v(O) =
PU'(X)19
11.2. Project Identification
In Proposition 3 the value of a life is determined by taking a
very specific weighted average ofeach individual's value of a life.
Namely, individuals gain an increase in the probabilityof survival of
1/N so that one life is expected to be saved. One waythis could
operationally be accomplished is to increase the probabilityof survival
by 1/N in each health status cell. Thus thevalue of a life really
refers to the value of a specific project, the unidentified project
=0,and we adopt the notation V(I, I =0)=V(I).We now wish to
consider the value of any other projects that also expect to save one
life.
Let 6k represent the distribution of a project'sbenefits
across health status cells, defined so that is the absolute incre-
ment in cell k's associated survival probability.The unidentified
project corresponds to cSkl.Allother projects can be summarized by




which arbitrarily scales all projects so that one life is expectedto
be saved.
It is apparent that so long as there is no individualidentifi-
cation then the value of all projects must be the same.No matter how
various projects distribute their benefits acrosshealth status cells,
there can be no distributional effect across individuals.All individuals
have identical cell assignment probabilitiesand therefore must expect
a gain of 1/N.20
If there is individual identification, however, then there may
be distributional effects. The value of the program, V, is given by
the summation of individuals' value of a life multiplied by the expected
benefits attributed to the program by the individual, or,
-— vU(x)v (2.9) V —P.U'(x)LikN ii k
Algebraic manipulation of equation (2.9) yields,
(2.10) V =V(I,0)+[P.((
—
or,defining the bracketed term as I and expanding V(I,0) back into V,
(2.11) (I,I) =V(0)+ (I + I)
I in this equation may be interpreted as the covariance between the
(reciprocal of) initial survival probability and the distribution of the
expected gain. I is positive if those with the lowest initial survival
probabilities expect to gain relatively the most)3
We summarize our findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Given any state of individual identification, which can
be summarized by
l. 1 1 —N.
—
1 1
then the value of a project expected to save one life is given by
V(i,I) =V(0)+ (I +1)
where I is the covariance of the reciprocal of initial survival proba-
bilities and relative expected survival probability gain. Ceteris paribus,21
programs that concentrate their benefits on those with the lowest
survival probability will have greater value.
11.3. Discussion
Projects to save lives have value, and merely because two projects
are expected to save an equal number of lives is not sufficient to insure
the projects have equal value. While it is sensible to refer to the
value of a life for a single individual, it is not sensible to refer
to the value of a life for a group of individuals. The criteria of
maximizing lives saved and maximizing ability to pay can clearly be at
odds with each other.
Propositions 3 and 4 provide simple rules for determining the
value of projects. As populations become better informed about the
ultimate heterogeneity of survival probabilities, the value of the
unidentified project will increase. In addition, projects that concentrate
their benefits on those with the lowest survival probabilities will have
greater value than those projects that do not.
As an example of two such projects, consider safety belt
utilization and laetrile treatment for cancer. Safety belts are likely
to be the nearest thing to the unidentified project that one can imagine.
It is well known that safety belts generate low willingness to pay.
Laetrile demand, on the other hand, concentrates its perceived benefits
on a population with known low survival probability. Apparently,
willingness to pay is quite high. Treatment is not covered by insurance
and often requires the expense of travel to a foreign country in addition
to the direct treatment cost.22
To the extent that government programs attempt to mimic the
allocation that would occur in a free market, one should not be surprised
to find variations in expenditures per life saved. Criticism of govern-
ment programs along these lines should be based upon careful analysis.23
III. TREATMENT VERSUS PREVENTION
It is commonly believed that today's health industry shows an
inordinate preference for treatment over prevention. In this section
we demonstrate that this result could be generated by individual maxi—
mizing behavior. In particular, th existence of a relatively ineffective
treatment may discourage individuals from purchasing a relatively
effective prevention.
By way of arriving at this result, we will also show that,
contrary to Bergstrom's [1974] result, individuals facing the prospect
of becoming very sick, with a resulting high demand for treatment, will
not necessarily purchase insurance.
We begin with Bergstrom's example. Aman faces a probability A that he
has a certain fatal disease. A painless treatment is available at a cost c, but
it succeedswithonly probability 0. If the treatment isnot purchasedhewill
die quickly and painlessly. Health insurance is available which will
pay for the treatment if the disease Is contracted. It Is priced at
the actuarially fair price of Ac. The man must decide whether to buy
the insurance before it is known whether or not he has the disease.
Three options are given to him:
1) Buy insurance.
2) Buy no Insurance and die if he gets the disease.
3) Buy the treatment if he gets the disease.
Bergstrom assumes as we do that the man has no bequest motive.
Further, the cost of the treatment is assumed to be less than the man's24
wealth, so he can afford to pay for the treatment himself if he chooses
to do so.
Bergstrom compared the options pairwise. First consider options 1
and 2. Purchase of the insurance adds AO to his probability of life
at a cost Ac. If AO is "small" then the insurance will be purchased
as long as the ratio of the gain in tLobability to the cost (do) is
greater than V. Let's assume the contrary (--<V) so that the insurance
is rejected, and option 2 is preferred to option 1.
Now consider alternatives 2 and 3. If he selects option 2 he
will die for sure if he gets the disease and thus his expected utility
is E2 =(1—A)U(x). On the other hand, if he buys the treatment upon
discovery of the disease, he will get an extra survival chance AO,
although with reduced wealth. Thus his expected utility will be
=(1—A)U(x) + AO U(x —c).
Option 3 clearly dominates option 2.
Now compare 1 and 3. Bergstrom argues that 1 should be
preferred to 3:
he realizes that he would go ahead and try the cure
even if he bought no insurance. Knowing that this is the
case he realizes that whether or not he buys insurance he
will attempt a cure if he has the disease. Whether or not
he buys the insurance, his probability of dying from the
disease is A(l—O). In either case his expected cost is
Ac, but if he buys insurance he pays Ac with certainty
and if he buys no insurance he pays c with probability A
and 0 with probability 1—A. If he is a risk averter he
will prefer to buy insurance. ...25
While this argument seems compelling, it iswrong.14 Even if
the individual is risk—averse, he may reject the insurance, as westate
in the following proposition:
Proposition 5: If an individual has a probabilityX of contracting a
fatal (if untreated) disease, for which the cost of
treatment is c (less hn his current assets) and the
probability of cur' is 0, the individual may refuse to
buy the insurance for the treatment at the actuarially
fair price Xc, even though he plans to purchase the
treatment if he gets the disease.





Notice that these expected utilities are just numbers so an
intransitivity is impossible. As we pointed out above, E3
must be preferred to E2 since E3 =E2+ XOU(x—c) and the
second term is positive as long as c<x, which has been assumed.
Now compare E1 and E2. Notice that if 0=0 then
E1 =(l—X)U(x—Xc)<(l—X)U(x)=E2.If the cure is completely
ineffective, then the purchase of insurance lowers the indi-
vidual's wealth without raising the chances of survival.
Clearly, there will be some 0* such that E1 =E2,but for any
0 <0*,E1 <E2.In this case we shall have E3 >E2
>E1.Q.E.D.
The key role of 0 is illustrated in FigurelJ5 If 0 <0*
insurance is actually worse than the "die if sick" option2. Not until
0 >0*will insurance be preferred to paying for the care himself.
This result is generated by the assumption that money is worth-
less if the individual dies. Consider an analgous example. The proba-
bility of an earthquake strong enough to destroy aman's house is X.
Given such an earthquake, the probability the man will survive is 0.
Will he purchase actuarially fair earthquake insurance for his house
if 0 is small? Clearly not; since he doesn't care about his asset(1-A)U(x)










position when dead, he won't be interested in insurance which pays off
mainly in states of the world in which he isdead)6
Proposition 5 has implications which gc beyond the question of
financing health expenditures. The results for insurance apDly with
equal force to prevention activities. Consider a disease which has two
strains, A and B. The probability of getting the disease is A. Given
the disease has been contracted, the probability that it is strain A
is 0 while the probability it is strain B is 1—0. A cure exists at a
cost c which is 100 percent successful for strain A, but completely
unsuccessful for strain B. Similarly, an innoculation is available at
a price ir which prevents the individual from getting strain A but not
strain B. Straightforward application of Proposition 5 implies that
people may purchase the cure for c dollars rather than the innoculation,
even if ii< Xc.This implies that individuals' purchases of cures will
yield smaller increases in survival rates than will equivalent purchases
of prevention activity.
The above example was constructed so that the cure would never
be purchased if the prevention had already been purchased, since it
would be ineffective. This was necessary to apply Proposition 5 directly.
However, Proposition 5 can be generalized to the case where both the
prevention and the cure may be purchased.
Proposition 6: Given the choice of buying prevention in advance or
treatment once the disease is discovered, or both
(or nothing), an individual may choose to purchase
only the treatment, even though the prevention is more
cost effective.
Proof: See Appendix.28
An interesting implication of Proposition 6 is that the intro-
duction of an ineffective treatment can induce people to cease prevention
activities 'even though their expected outlays will go up and their
expected survival chances go down. An extreme case of such behavior can
be illustrated with another numerical example.
Example 3: Consider a single individual with utility function
p ln(x+l), with x =10.Assume he faces a probability
A =0.01of contracting a fatal disease. An innoculation
exists which reduces this probability by 35 percent and
costs $.09. A treatment is available at $9, which is
effective only five percent of the time.
Even at these odds (with the prevention seven times more effective) the
individual will choose to buy just the treatment if sick, yielding a
survival probability of .9905. Yet if the treatment were not available,
he would choose the prevention and have a survival chance of .9935.
It is interesting to compare these theoretical results with the
data presented in Table 1. The table presents estimates of the cost of
various life—saving programs per life saved. The programs are ranked
from most cost effective to least. While we are not sure exactly what
each program entailed, it appears true that prevention programs such
as safety belts are much more effective than treatment programs such as
the cancer programs. This is, of course, consistent with the behavior
characterized in Proposition 6.29
IV. THETIMINGOF LIFE-SAVING DECISIONS
IV.l.Ex Ante and Ex Post
In section I we showed that the goal of maximizing lives saved
might be inconsistent with consumer sovereignty and the corresponding
willingness to pay criterion. In see ion II we examined how value of
a life varied with "information." We now examine a related question:
How do society's preferences about life saving vary with the timing of
information? We return to Example 1 to illustrate the potential importance
of the timing of life—saving decisions.
A society of 25 people was divided into two groups. Group 1
contained 10 people with survival probability p =.2,while Group 2
contained 15 people with p= .7. A program to raise p by .1 could be
adopted for only one group. We saw that while giving the program to
Group 2 saved more lives, it would not be the program adopted under
willingness to pay. Stated in the language of Section II, the covariance
of reciprocal initial survival probabilities and the distribution of
program benefits is higher for Program 1. Obviously, if individuals
did not know into which group they would be allotted there can be no
project identification, and using ability to pay, Program 2 would be
chosen.
Example 4: Assume that the 25 individuals learn of the risks described
in Example 1 today, but will not learn of the composition
of the groups until the following week.
Ex ante, Project 2 would be chosen. Ex post, Project 1 would
be chosen. When will the decision be made?17 The optimal decision, by
assumption, is the one that maximizes willingness to pay. Ex ante30
Project 1 can attract $44.75; Project 2, $67.31. Ex post the corres-
ponding amounts are $60.50 and $42.75. Project 2, chosen ex ante, will
be the decision made. A profit maximizing firm would choose to market
Project 2 ex ante and collect from the whole population. It is quite
simple to alter the numbers above so that Project 1, chosen ex post,
becomes optimal. A profit—maximizing firm would wait and market Project 1
ex post, collecting only from the members of Group 1.
The assumption that no one knows which group he will be in
corresponds to Rawls' [1971] "original position" where decisions are
made "behind a veil of ignorance." Since an individual's preferences
in the original position simply reflect in which society he would prefer
to be a random citizen, ex ante preferences have some normative signifi-
cance.
The choice made using the ex ante willingness to pay criterion
has one peculiar feature. Program 1 is selected even though the members
of Group 2 will clearly be worse off. Another criterion such as Rawls'
maximin would choose Program 2.
Example 5: Consider a society that will have two groups. Let both
groups be of the same size, have the same initialsurvival
probabilities, but have different wealth levels. Assume
Group H will have high wealth while Group L will have low
wealth. A program can be adopted to save one life from
either group, but it must be selected before the assignment
of individuals to groups is known.
In this example individuals will prefer the program that saves
one member of Group H. Society will choose to save therich! This is
not due to the greater ability of the rich to pay. It isdue to the
life—or—death nature of the problem. Since there is no way to make the
quality of Group L life better through the choice ofeither program,31
individuals will choose the program which improves their survival
chances in the richer state. This result is even more strikingly
inegalitarian than the result in Example 4.
What is the normative significance of these ex ante choices?
A logical case can be made both for and against the ex ante choice.
First consider the arguments aga1nst
1) The choices have "bad" distributional outcomes.
2) They ignore ex post willingness to pay.
3) Later decisions are based on more information and thus
should be "better."
But the arguments in favor are:
1) All choices made in the original position are in some
sense egalitarian. In this case the individuals know about the forth-
coming distributions, but prefer to act in a way which just appears
inegalitarian.
2) Ex post willingness to pay by Group 2 (with the low survival
probability) should be ignored (or, rather, discounted) because their
willingness is based, in part, on their slim chances of survival. Since
they are likely to die, the dollars they are offering are in some sense
worth less to them. It is only their inability to trade with Group 1
(and thus purchase some p directly) which allows them to outbid Group 1.
3) The "information" is purely distributional——who will lose
rather than how much will be lost. When choosing in the original
position this information is ignored by intent. Its knowledge cannot
improve the decisions.32
Three among the many possible criteria are:1) ex ante willing-
ness to pay; 2) ex post willingness to pay; 3) maximum willingness to
pay (as would be practiced by a profit—maximizing firm). We leave to
the reader to evaluate the normative merits of each of these criteria.
IV.2. How to Maximize Lives Saved
Whilewedo not necessarily advocate maximization of lives saved
as a goal for government policy, it is interesting to consider how it
could be accomplished. We conclude that given reasonable assumptions
about insurance and annuity markets, it could only be accomplished
through extensive government intervention.
We have shown that a pure market system will lead those who are
fatally ill to spend large amounts on ineffective, expensive treatments.
Yet in the original position everyone would prefer to spend the money
in other more productive ways. To avoid the low productivity expendi-
tures society will have to precommit everyone to the prescribed decisions.
This seems to require enforced prohibitions against ineffective treat-
ments. Private health insurance companies or prepaid health care plans
could exclude such treatments from their coverage. However, this would
not prevent those enrollees who get very sick from spending their own
(more limited) funds elsewhere. Furthermore, such contracts would be
very complex and probably too expensive to be feasible. In fact, the
existence of these institutions probably exaggerates the effect since
they provide the very sick with themeans to satisfy their nearly
unlimited desire for treatment.33
It is interesting to note that one way insurance companies
have limited such expenditures is by placing an upper limit on total
claims. This type of "shallow" coverage has been severely criticized
by most economists writing in this area (see for example Arrow [19631
or Feldstein [19711). Yet we can see that a case could be made for
these limits being socially desirable. In fact, if the government
provides "catastrophic" insurance for health care, then there may well
be a sizeable increase in expenditures on ineffective treatments.
Banning ineffective treatments, however, is a policy of dubious
value. Practically, it may be unenforceable (as the recent laetrile
experience has suggested) and politically it appears to be both cold-
blooded and meddlesome——a combination likely to anger both liberals and
conservatives.
If one is intent upon maximizing lives saved, intermediate steps
may be possible. For example, developmental research leading to new
treatments is often funded at government expense. Using expected cost
per life saved as one of many criteria by which research priorities are
established would be one such step.34
FOOTNOTES
1.See Mishan [1971], Sche.Lling [1968], Thaler and Rosen [1976],
and Zeckhauser [1975].
2. As quoted in Steven E. Rhoades [19781.
3. For analyses of "once arc1forall" risks this is quite
reasonable. For a formal justification, see Bergstrom [1974].
4. This point was made to us by Victor R. Fuchs.
5. This example, which we believe is due to Zeckhauser, is also
discussed by Bergstrom.
6. This, and all following propositions, assume individuals
maximize the expected utility function pU(x).
7. An economy will not, for example, maximize the number of
gallons of drinking water it could produce for a given expenditure.
Since water is costly to transport, a gallon of water in Palo Alto,
California, will be valued more than a gallon of water in Rochester,
New York. A plan to provide an extra million gallons of water to Palo
Alto would not seem unreasonable just because five million gallons could
be provided to Rochester for the same price!
8. This intent was confirmed by Schelling in personal conversation
with one of the authors.
9. The importance of this effect is illustrated by the attempt
of charities to "identify" otherwise statistical lives in their fund—
raising activities. A well—known example was the annual selection of a
"poster child" in the March of Dimes drive against polio.35
10. This presentation was stimulated by H. N. Shefrin.
11. The use of health status as the basis for cell definitions
is arbitrary. Alternative bases could be age, sex, race, etc.
12. Note that I may be rewritten as the difference between the
inverse of the harmonic and arithmetic means of P.. Since the harmonic
1
mean is always less than the arithmic mean except in the special case
where all areequal, the result follows.
13. The term relative here has little meaning since the
covariance may be rewritten in terms of absolute gains f -i).The
k
interpretation of I is then N multiplied by the covariance in absolute
terms.
14. Jack Hirschleifer has also pointed out the same error in
personal communication with Bergstrom.
15. The diagram in Figure 1 is due to Robert Willis.
16. The result may be eliminated if a strong bequest motive
exists. Also, in the absence of a bequest motive it will be eliminated
by the introduction of perfect annuity markets. If the individual can
purchase a fair annuity his valuation of money becomes independent of
the probability of survival.
17. A similar formal problem has been discussed in different
contexts by Hirshleifer (1971) and Arrow (1978).36
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APPENDIXA: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Notation: A: probability has disease
c: cost of treatment
0cprobability treatment produces cure.
p: cost of innoculation
0: probability innoculation produces cure.
Numbering the four options:
1. Purchase neither the prevention nor the treatment,
2. Purchase the treatment If sick, but not the prevention,
3. Purchase the prevention but not the treatment if sick,
4. Purchase the prevention and the treatment If sick,




it= 1—A + AU—l A(l—U )0 4 p p c




E4 =(1—A+ AQ )TJ(x—p) + A(l_O)01J(x_P_c).
Clearly option 2 dominates option 1 (E2 >E1),and option 4 dominates
option 3 (E4 >E3).Define as the value of 0thatequates E3 and E1.39
Then,
0* =?) — 1)>
If0 ￿ 0* 1, then 0* has the interpretation as that prevention
effectiveness that, given the cost of prevention p, would make the mdi-
vidual indifferent between the two dternatives: dying if sick and
purchasing the prevention. 0* need not be so bounded, however.





Given this value 0 ,E E
p 3 1
Define E =
E3+ AOU(x_c) and note that E2 can be written
E2 =E1+ XOcU(X_C)•
Hence, E E2. Proving that >
E4is then sufficient to prove E2 >E4.
Clearly,
U(x—c) >(l—0)U(x—p—c).
Multiplying through by A0 and then adding E3 to both sides, we obtain
E3 + AOU(x—c) >E3+ A(l_0)0U(x_P_c)
or
E >E4. Q.E.D.40
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL PROOFS
Generalizations of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 stated and proved that the "value of a life" V.
measured by willingness to pay, falls as the probability of survival
increased for all utility functions of the form E =pU(x),U'(x) >0.
We shall now show the conditions under which this result may be general-
ized both over utility functions that include an explicit bequest branch
and over perfect life insurance markets. To clearly differentiate between
the effects of assuming perfect markets and the effects of assuming
bequest dependent utility, we will first generalize Proposition 1 to
allow for perfect annuity markets.
Assuming perfect annuity markets, the expected utility function
is of the form
(B—i)E =pU(x/p), U' >0
where p =theprobability of survival and x =initialwealth. The term
"perfect annuity markets" simpiy means that should the individual survive
he consumes x/p, while if he dies his endowed wealth x is given over to
some third party. We draw no distinction here between human and physical
wealth, but assume that all wealth is transferable. It is worth noting
that a utility function like (B—i) may in some sense be a more reasonable
specification than the more restrictive specification used In the text.
So long as some wealth is transferable, and society does not adopt the
policy of burying physical wealth with corpses, some form of annuity
"market" must exist. The form of the distribution rule, however, need41
not be as postulated here, where the wealth of the dead is divided among
the survivors according to an inverse probability rule.
Theorem B—i
Given the utility function (B—i), the "value of a life,"
V =— isstrictly positive, zero, or negative, according to whether
u is strictly concave, strictly quasi—concave, or strictly convex,
respectively.
Proof: Taking the total derivative of (B—i) we obtain
U(X\—x
dx 'P' p 'P
(B—2) —— = ______________
dp
'p
and U()()U'()according to the concavity of U. Q.E.D.
Theorem B—2 (Proposition 1 variant)
Given the utility function (B—i), and assuming U to be strictly
concave, the "value of a life" V decreases with p.









which is strictly negative since U" <0by the definition of
concavity, and V >0by Theorem A.i. Q.E.D.42
Thus, we have established Proposition 1 under the assumption of
perfect annuity markets for strictly concave utility functions. More
interesting, we have proven in Theorem B—i that the probability of
survival is not even a good for non—strictly concave utility functions.





where XL =wealthconditional upon living, and XD =(bequestmotivated)
wealth conditional upon dying. For the moment we treat XL and XD as
exogenous, I.e., we assume the non—existence of insurance markets that
allow transferring wealth from one state to the other.
Theorem B—3
Given a utility function of the form (B—4), a sufficient condi-
tion to Insure that the "value of a life" V is positive is that
<




(B—5)V ——— — ,
dp pU (XL)
Thus,the sign of V hinges upon the sign of U(xL) —V(xD). Q.E.D.43
TheoremB—4 (Proposition 1 variant)
Given a utility function of the form (B—4), and assuming
ljJ(xD) < U(x) for all values of XD and the "value of a life" V
decreases with p.







Thus we have established Proposition 1 under the assumption of
no insurance markets and a bequest utility function. Sufficient, although
not necessary for the result, is that i lie everywhere below U, i.e.,
suicide is never motivated by economic reasons. Ignoring the existence
of insurance markets, however, does not seem very reasonable. But now
imagine that XL and XD are the result of a previous maximization——namely
the purchase of insurance. Further assume, as is eminently reasonable,
that the insurance contract is not contingent upon future behavior, i.e.,
XL and XD are not affected by changes in p. Then this result would take
on particular relevance if it could be proved that the ability to re—enter
the insurance market, i.e., sell back some of the previous contract or
buy more of a new contract at currently fair prices, in no way affects
the above results. In fact, it can be proved that the individual would
never re—enter the insurance market at all——i.e., insurance is a once—
and—for—all decision that once made does not affect future behavior
except in that it affected XL and44
To demonstrate this result, let us rewrite equation (B—4) as
(B—7) E =pU(x—'uI)+ (l_p)uP(xN + I)
U', uji' > 0; U", 'P"<0
where I is the insurance sold at price ri, x is total consumable wealth,
human and non—human, conditional upon living, and is that part of
total wealth that is transferable.
Theorem B—5;
Given a utility function of the form (B—7) and assuming life
insurance is available at "fair" prices with multiplicative loading
factor k, i.e.,
(B-8) ¶ =(1)k, k ￿ 1.
Then the optimal purchase of the insurance, 1*, is a positive function
of the survival probability p, 0 < p < 1.
Proof:We first derive 1* by
(B—9) maxE=pU(x—'nI)+ (l—p)uP(x+I)
{I}
The optimal 1* is given by
(B-lU) U'(x-'urI) =
Andthe sufficient condition for 1* to be a solution is that
U", up" < 0. Totally differentiating (B—9) with respect to I
and p yields45
(B—li) = U"k >
p (U"rr +
where the arguments for U and V have been suppressed for nota-
tional clarity. Q.E.D.
Theorem B—6
Under the assumptions of Theorem B—5 above, if after solving
(B—9) and obtaining 1* consistent with (B—b), the probability of survival
changes from p to p', and the individual is allowed to change his insur-
ance position at the new "fair" prices with the same multiplicative
loading factor, i.e.,
(B-i2)rt =(1,')k.
He will neither purchase nor sell insurance. I.e., 1* is a solution to
any survival probability after it has been purchased.
Proof:Given 1* consistent with (B—lU), the problem facing the individual
is given by
(B—13)max p'U(x —111*—Tr'I)+ (1 —p')lp(xN
+ 1* + SI).
{I}
Thus, I must be chosen consistent with
(B—14) U'(x —irl*—ir'I)= '(xN + 1* + Al).
Clearly one possible AT is AI* =0,since in that case (B—14)
reduces to (B—b). Indeed, given the convexity of E, the
solution must be unique and so tI* =0is the only solution.
Q.E.D.46
The final question, then, is does Proposition 1 hold if the
life insurance and increments in survival probability are purchased
simultaneously? Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to this
problem.